Commitment failures are unlikely to undermine public support for the Paris agreement by Beiser-McGrath, Liam F. & Bernauer, Thomas
Commitment-Failures Are Unlikely to Undermine 
Public Support for the Paris Agreement 
 
 
Liam F. Beiser-McGrath1 
 
 
Thomas Bernauer2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
 
 
Success of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which is founded on Nationally Deter- 
mined Contributions (NDCs), hinges on whether domestic support for 
international environmental agreements would be undermined if countries that 
are crucial to the global effort fail to reduce their emissions. Here we find that 
citizens in China (n = 3000) and the United States (n = 3007) have strong 
preferences over the design of international climate agreements, and 
contributions of other countries to the global effort. However, contrary to what 
standard accounts of international politics would predict, a survey-embedded 
experiment in which respondents were randomly exposed to different 
information on other countries’ behavior showed that information on other 
countries failing to reduce their emissions does not undermine support for how 
international agreements are designed. While other factors still make large 
emission cuts challenging, these results suggest that the Paris approach per se 
is not posing a problem. 
 
 
 
Many of the world's environmental problems can only be solved through concerted 
international efforts. This has led to hundreds of multilateral environmental treaties, 
which vary tremendously in their ambition levels and effectiveness (1;2). One key 
challenge with such efforts is that any given country's contribution to a collective effort is 
likely to depend, to varying degrees, on how much other countries contribute (3;4;5). 
This makes such efforts potentially vulnerable to non-cooperation by others, notably 
when countries responsible for a large part of a highly salient environmental problem fail 
to cooperate or disengage from existing cooperation (6;7;8;9). 
 
Non-cooperation by countries that are important to international environmental problem 
solving can affect collective efforts in various ways. Most obviously, such non-cooperation 
usually means that problem solving is incomplete, in the sense that the 
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share of the problem the non-cooperator is responsible for is not taken care of. Equally 
important, however: non-cooperation by others can also enhance the political leverage of 
non-green parts of electorates and interest groups in any given country whose 
government otherwise would want to cooperate, particularly when cooperation is costly 
and economic level-playing field arguments can be invoked (10;11;12). 
 
While the former pathway to vulnerability of international environmental agreements is 
certainly crucial and rather well-researched, the latter pathway, operating primarily 
through public opinion, has received much less attention. Climate change mitigation, on 
which we focus here, is highly interesting in this respect. The transition from an explicit 
burden-sharing and formal targets-based approach under the Kyoto Protocol to the pledge 
and review approach under the Paris Agreement has come with less clarity about how 
strongly key emitters are really committed to reducing their emissions. Moreover, the 
largest historical emitter country, the United States, has explicitly disengaged from the 
Paris process, while some other important countries are sending mixed signals (13). 
 
As already noted, one important mechanism through which uncertainty over the problem 
solving contribution by large emitter countries may weaken the political resolve of other 
countries operates through public opinion. Many studies show that policy choices by 
governments tend to follow some kind of thermostatic process (14;15). That is, they are 
associated with prevailing public demand for government (in-)action in a given area (16), 
though well-organized interest groups may at times lead to deviations from prevailing 
public opinion (median voter policy preferences) (17;18;19) and public opinion may 
oftentimes affect policy-choices not directly but via elite perception of public opinion (20). 
In climate policy, where mitigation measures have strong and direct effects on people's 
everyday lives, public support for such measures is thus particularly relevant (21). 
 
To begin with, the NDC approach, relative to the previous approach of explicit, legally 
binding emission targets, may from the viewpoint of the public in any given country create 
more uncertainty, a priori, about whether other countries will stick to their pledges. Such 
uncertainty arises at two levels. First, various studies explaining widespread compliance 
with international legal commitments point to domestic audience costs as a key factor 
(22;23). They argue that government accountability to citizens implicates that when 
governments accept an international legal commitment and then fail to comply this is likely 
to reduce political support levels from citizens. Second, non-compliance with international 
legal commitments usually attracts criticism from other parties of the respective agreement 
and may even result in punitive action by others. The shift to NDCs increases uncertainty 
about how the domestic public and other countries would respond to “non-compliance” 
with less formal commitments that did not result from an explicit international bargain 
following a legally binding “give-and-take” logic. 
 
These two potential sources of uncertainty have not prevented the large majority of 
countries from engaging in the Paris process and putting forth NDCs. Nonetheless, they 
could make governments and their publics more “edgy” with respect to the behavior of 
other countries, compared to the Kyoto approach. Following the
logic of “tacit bargaining” (24), in the absence of a formal international deal, one should 
assume that governments and their publics are likely to adopt a wait-and-see attitude 
and adjust their support levels for their own country’s emission cuts in response to 
observing what other countries do. We should thus expect that public climate policy 
support levels in any given country decrease in response to other countries’ failure to 
cut their emissions, and vice-versa. This should be particularly so when commitment-
failure occurs in a large emitter country. 
 
To assess this possibility, and thus the risk posed by the NDC approach, we examined how 
public opinion in the world's two largest emitter countries, China and the United States, is 
affected by the mitigation behavior of other countries. Our approach can be regarded as a 
stress-test on the Paris Agreement from a public opinion perspective (25). To this end, we 
carried out survey experiments in China (n = 3000) and the United States (n = 3007), 
using quota sampling to ensure representative samples in terms of age, employment 
status, gender, income, and region (see Methods). In a conjoint experiment, participants 
were asked five times to choose between two randomly assigned policy proposals whose 
characteristics differ along a set of attributes (cost per household, legal strength of the 
agreement, decision-making process, inclusion of large emitters, number of countries 
included, and compensation to affected areas; see Supplementary Table 1). This resulted 
in a final number of observations (N) of 30000 and 30070 for China and the USA 
respectively. The attributes tested here are particularly relevant, as they capture citizens’ 
willingness to accept certain cost implications, domestic compensation for policy-losers, as 
well as important international policy design features that could safeguard against free-
riding or commitment failure by others. This conjoint experiment was combined with an 
information provision experiment, where respondents were randomly assigned information 
on other countries' coal consumption compared to the home country's consumption (see 
Supplementary Figure 1). While conjoint experiments have previously been used in a few 
studies to examine public support for international climate agreements and also unilateral 
climate policy (26;27), the combination with an information provision experiment, the 
treatment designs, and the statistical approach to analyze the data are novel. This study 
design allows us to estimate the causal effect of information about other countries' 
behavior upon preferences over the design of global climate policy as well as national 
effort levels, as well as the causal effect of specific contents of policy proposals upon 
support (28).  
 
To estimate the treatment effects of interest, we use a recently developed Bayesian variable 
selection method, LASSOplus, which enables us to simultaneously select and estimate 
relevant heterogenous treatment effects (29). See Methods for details. 
 
 
 
Public support for climate agreement design features 
 
 
The unconditional average marginal component effects (AMCEs, Figure 1) for the China 
and US samples, which result from the analysis of data from the conjoint experiment, give 
us a sense of the general patterns of public support for particular features of international 
climate agreement design. Notably, the results are broadly similar for both countries and 
in the direction of previous research in this area, though most of this research focuses 
only on the US and a few other Western countries (26;27). International climate 
agreements become less popular when costs increase, fewer of the major emitters are 
included, and when agreements are weaker in terms of legal status and enforcement. 
They become more popular with a larger number of participating countries, when details 
of the agreement are jointly decided by countries, and when some form of compensation 
mechanism is included. 
 
We also observe some substantive differences in the salience of agreement design features 
when comparing Chinese and US publics. Chinese respondents tend to place more 
importance on the legal status of the international agreement. US respondents, however, 
tend to be particularly concerned about China's inclusion in the agreement, with an 
international agreement including China receiving higher levels of support. US study 
participants are more sensitive to the individual cost of an agreement. Nevertheless, 
preferences over the design of an international climate agreement are quite similar, 
suggesting commonalities in what citizens in different countries consider important features 
of such an agreement. 
 
These results demonstrate that the public does care a lot about what an international 
climate agreement should look like, and also about contributions of other countries to the 
global effort. In fact, the most popular agreement proposals in both the China and US 
samples have a probability of acceptance in the order of around 80% and 90%, 
compared to 25% and 15% for the least popular agreement proposals, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Public support for features of international climate agreements . The 
points indicate how the probability of support for an international environmental 
agreement changes when respondents receive an attribute value, compared to the 
appropriate baseline value, for respondents in China (N = 30000; circles) and the United 
States (N = 30070; triangles). Varied attributes related to a) Cost to household per year; 
b) Legal strength of the agreement; c) decision-making process; d) inclusion of large 
emitters; e) number of countries included; f) compensation to affected areas. The lines 
indicate 95% credible intervals. 
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Combining the conjoint experiment with the information provision treatments, which 
implicates a much more complex study design than in previous research, allows us to 
address whether and how much non-cooperation by other countries could undermine 
public support. Specifically, it reveals whether non-cooperation by other countries induces 
less public support for climate policy, and whether it induces changes in the relative 
saliency of design features of an international climate agreement that reflect reciprocity 
concerns.  
 
The first four treatment conditions (see Supplementary Figure 1) compare the fossil fuel, 
specifically coal, consumption behavior of the respondent’s home country to that of 
another country (USA/China, depending on sample, or the UK) or generic “other 
countries”. These information treatments capture the possible combinations of whether a 
specific country is mentioned or not, and whether the other country(ies) increased or 
decreased fossil fuel consumption. Treatment 5 gives respondents information only on 
their own country, while the control group receives no information about either their own 
country and other countries’ coal consumption. By allowing AMCEs from the conjoint 
experiment to vary according to which information treatment a study participant receives 
in the information provision experiment, we can estimate whether and how much 
preferences are dependent upon other countries' fossil fuel consumption and thus 
emissions behavior. 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of information provision on support for the most popular climate 
agreement. Probability of support for the most popular agreements in China (N = 30000) 
and the United States (N = 30070) as a function of information provided about other 
countries. Lines indicate 83.4% confidence intervals, to visually assess whether the 
estimates are significantly different from one another. The most popular agreements are 
located in Supplementary Table 23. 
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 Figure 2 first displays how support for the most popular international climate agreement in 
the control group changes when individuals are given information about their own and other 
countries’ behaviour. The results show that information about other countries’ increasing 
emissions can lead to a decline in support for the respective climate agreement, relative to 
other possible agreements. For example, the probability of acceptance for this climate 
agreement decreases by 0.12 when study participants are given information about the UK 
increasing coal consumption. However, this impact is not particularly significant, as even 
with this change the probability of acceptance for the agreement remains higher than 0.75, 
suggesting that support remains high. 
 
Effects of information upon support for agreement features 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of information provision on support for international climate 
agreement features. Change in support for features of an agreement in China (N = 
30000; circles) and the United States (N = 30070; triangles) based on exposure to 
information about other countries' behavior. Points indicate the change in probability of 
support for an agreement when respondents receive this value, compared to the baseline, 
within a treatment condition. Lines indicate 95% credible intervals. a) Cost to household per 
year; b) legal strength of agreement; c) decision-making process; d) inclusion of large 
emitters; e) number of countries included; f) compensation to affected areas. 
 
To further understand our results, Figure 3 displays how preferences for the specific 
features of an agreement are affected by information about the behavior of other 
countries, compared to respondents’ respective home country. As a general result, we see 
that Chinese respondents are remarkably unresponsive to other countries’ behavior, when 
compared to the US sample. The only heterogenous effect selected is that Chinese 
respondents who receive information only about China’s coal consumption are less 
sensitive to paying 100RMB compared to 50RMB. Therefore, for the remaining discussion 
of these results we focus on the US sample. 
 
 
Cost. Other countries increasing or decreasing their coal consumption does not have a 
consistent impact. The only pattern that emerges is that if other countries are increasing 
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 emissions US respondents are less sensitive to cost, compared to if others are decreasing 
emissions. This suggests that inaction by other countries may actually lead to US 
respondents being more willing to pay for climate action. 
 
Legal strength. We find some evidence that other countries increasing their emissions 
leads to a decrease in support for legally less binding agreements. This is matched by an 
increase in support for agreements with a formal legal basis, notably in the case of US 
respondents receiving information about China’s increase in coal consumption or only 
information on US coal consumption. 
 
 
Decision-Making. We find some evidence that other countries increasing their 
emissions motivates US respondents to support agreements that involve a joint decision-
making process. This effect is also mirrored in the control group. 
 
Inclusion of other countries. US respondents do not wish to exclude countries that 
have increased their emissions. For example, when given information about China’s 
increased emissions, they are more supportive of including China in the agreement. If 
anything, US respondents are less likely to demand that “friendly” countries be a part of 
the agreement if the information suggests that other countries are also reducing coal 
consumption. This is shown by the decrease in support for including the EU in agreement 
when individuals receive information about other countries decreasing coal consumption. 
 
Number of countries. There is no consistent pattern with respect to this policy at- 
tribute. While increased emissions by the UK lead to a desire for involving more 
countries, information on other countries’ and China’s emissions behavior does not 
induce such a response. 
 
Compensation. The results show that information about the US’ decrease in coal 
consumption leads to increased support for compensation measures, independent of 
information about other countries’ coal consumption. This is shown by the control group, 
which receives no information about US or others’ coal consumption, being significantly 
less supportive of compensation measures. This suggests that a lack of support for 
compensation for the coal industry is driven by a belief that the industry has not faced a 
significant decline in previous years. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
We find that both Chinese and US publics have strong preferences over the design of 
international climate policy, in terms of what they prefer most and least. Nevertheless, 
failure of other countries to act does not, per se, reduce the public’s appetite for taking 
action against climate change. This is most obviously the case in China, where the 
behavior of other countries has effectively no impact whatsoever upon preferences over 
climate policy design. While we do find some effects of information on other countries’ 
behavior on preferences towards particular attributes of climate policy design, this does 
not lead to a substantive decrease in overall support for the most popular international 
climate policy. 
 
One limitation of our research might be that our information provision treatments focus on 
coal. While this is meant to make those treatments easy to grasp and avoid false negatives 
 due to “ordinary citizens’” inability to properly understand this information, it might have 
stacked the deck in favor of non-reciprocal policy preferences. The reason is that reducing 
coal consumption, in addition to mitigating global climate change, can also have local 
public health benefits. In view of other research suggesting that the mass public supports 
even unilateral reductions in fossil fuel consumption generally (not just coal) (9;27;30;31), 
we do not think that focusing on coal has, per se, biased our findings. Moreover, our 
results are broadly similar for China, which faces severe local air pollution problems linked 
to burning of coal, and the United States, whose air pollution levels are much lower. We 
are thus quite confident that our results are not an artefact of focusing on coal. However, 
it would be useful to replicate our study focusing on fossil fuels and emissions more 
generally. Moreover, further research could re-assess the audience cost argument noted 
above to obtain more nuanced insights into the relevance of international reciprocity in 
global climate policy. Specifically, it would be interesting to explore whether and how 
political support of citizens for their respective government (rather than for climate policy 
more narrowly), defined in broad terms, changes as they learn that their government 
sticks to its existing NDC, or weakens its commitment to the latter, in response to other 
countries weakening their commitment or disengaging from mitigation policy. 
 
A further limitation of our study might be that a majority of Chinese respondents did not 
correctly understand our treatments shown that Chinese coal consumption increased in 
the time period covered by treatment information (see Supplementary Figure 3). We 
suspect that this may be a result of the current political climate in China. Another 
possibility is that respondents may have focused on a small decrease in 2011-2012, rather 
than the general increase in the overall time frame. Analyses excluding those who failed 
the respective comprehension checks does not significantly change the results for Chinese 
respondents. This, along with the fact that the main focus of our study is on the effect of 
information about other countries’ behavior, leads us to conclude that this issue does not 
significantly impact the inferences we wish to make in this paper. Nevertheless, future 
research could benefit from more closely considering how the political climate in countries 
may impact attempts to measure public opinion. 
 
Our findings build on and add to existing research that has used simpler study designs to 
investigate public support for unilateral climate policy (9;27;30;31). They suggest that, at 
least for the time being, public support for current and future commitments countries 
have expressed as part of the Paris process is not vulnerable to commitment failures or 
even disengagement by other countries, for example the United States, even though 
citizens do pay attention to what other countries do and prefer other countries to 
contribute. Rather, it seems that citizens' preferences towards the make-up of 
international climate policy are quite solid, in the sense of being stable also in view of 
information on non-cooperation by other countries. As a result, climate policy has 
probably become less prone to traditional concerns over reciprocity and, related, burden-
sharing and free-riding that are important in other areas of international cooperation, 
such as trade and security. Rather, we think that our findings may be reflective of an 
emerging global norm, to which the IPCC, civil society, and other actors have been 
contributing, that mitigating climate change is the “right thing to do”, even in view of 
commitment failures by others.  
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 Methods 
 
Survey procedure and respondents  
 
The survey was fielded with Ipsos online panels in November and December 2016. 
Fielding the survey directly with Ipsos means that they engaged in a number of quality 
control steps, for instance excluding speeders or preventing duplicate responders, 
details of which can be found at: https://ems.ipsos-
mori.com/Assets/Docs/Techniques/ESOMAR-28-Questions.pdf 
 
Ipsos used quota sampling in order to be representative of the general population. For 
the USA quotas were based upon age, employment status, gender, income, and region. 
Participants from China were recruited online from tier I and II cities and quota sampling 
was used to ensure representativeness for age, employment status, gender, income, and 
region. 
 
In Supplementary Figures 2 and 3 we show that these observable characteristics of 
individuals are balanced across treatment conditions. See Supplementary Tables 2-22 for 
regression tables of these estimates.  
 
Participants provided demographic information, then received the information 
treatment followed by a comprehensive check, prior to the conjoint experiment. 
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Information Provision Treatments 
 
To identify the causal effects of information on other countries' behavior on preferences 
over specific climate policy attributes, we combined this conjoint experiment with an 
experiment where we randomly assigned participants to one of six information treatment 
arms where information was provided on other countries' coal consumption compared to 
the home country's consumption in the past few years (see Supplementary Table 2 for 
the distribution of treatment assignment in the sample). By using real information, we 
made these treatments as plausible as possible while still adhering to the non-deception 
principle. Supplementary Figure 1 summarises the treatment conditions, in terms of 
whether a country or set of countries increased or decreased coal consumption. Study 
participants received such information both in verbal and graphical form (see Section 7 
of the Supplementary Information). The first four treatment conditions compare the 
consumption behavior of the respondent’s home country to that of another country or 
countries. These information treatments capture the possible combinations of whether a 
specific country is mentioned or not (T1 and T2 vs. T3 and T4), and whether the other 
country(ies) increased or decreased coal consumption. Treatment 5 gives respondents 
only their own country’s information, while the control group receives no information 
about both their own country and other countries’ coal consumption. These treatment 
conditions and their combinations allow us to assess and compare, based on realistic 
information, the effect of learning about one’s own and also other countries’ emissions.  
 
Respondents were asked comprehension check questions (see Supplementary Figure 3), 
depending on the information treatment they received. 
20  
Conjoint Experiment 
 
For our conjoint experiment, participants were asked to choose between randomly 
assigned policy proposals whose characteristics differ along a set of attributes: Cost to 
household per year, legal strength of agreement,  decision-making process, inclusion of 
large emitters, number of countries included, and compensation to affected areas. . Study 
participants were shown sets of two proposed climate agreements, side by side, where 
the values on specific policy attributes are manipulated and randomly assigned. 
Participants then choose which policy they prefer. They chose between two randomly 
generated climate agreements five times in total. The 3007 participants in the USA and 
3000 in China thus generate information on their support levels for a total of 30000 and 
30700 hypothetical climate agreements respectively (five rounds times two proposals, 
times the number of study participants). 
 
Supplementary Table 1 displays the policy (climate agreement) attributes and their 
possible values (expressions), as used in the conjoint experiment. Section 1 of the 
Supplementary Information also displays the text that introduced the conjoint experiment. 
The climate policy attributes in our experiment reflect features that could change in 
salience from the viewpoint of citizens, depending on the fossil fuel consumption, and thus 
emissions behavior of othercountries. These features can be grouped into three broad 
categories: financing and expenditures; country participation; and the legal nature and 
strength of the international agreement. To make the experiment as simple and 
straightforward as possible, which is essential for “ordinary citizens” being able to 
understand and process the information they receive, we decided to focus on coal 
consumption. 
 
For financing and expenditures, we vary the cost individuals would pay in the form of 
increased utility bills. We also vary whether an agreement includes provisions for 
(domestic) government expenditures that would be targeted to regions dependent upon 
the coal industry. We expect that citizens will be more sensitive to cost considerations and 
demand higher financial support if other countries are seen to be failing to reduce 
emissions. For country participation, we vary the number of countries participating in the 
agreement, as well as whether specific "large emitter" countries are participating. We 
expect that providing information that other countries have increased their fossil fuel 
consumption could alter whether individuals think it is necessary to include more countries, 
that could potentially also be laggards, into the agreement. Finally, we also vary the legal 
and decision-making features of the agreement. We vary the extent to which the 
agreement is legally binding and envisages punishment for non- compliance. We also vary 
the decision-making process, ranging from full autonomy in deciding the level of a carbon 
(coal) tax to having all countries involved in the decision. Faced with information that other 
countries have increased fossil fuel consumption, citizens may demand more stringent 
legal provisions in the agreement and give greater autonomy to their home country in 
making the decision. 
 
 
Conjoint designs are analogous to factorial designs. However as shown by (28), full 
randomisation overcomes the practical issue that the number of combinations in a 
complicated factorial can easily exceed the number of  observations. Specifically, (28) 
show within the potential out- comes framework that with full randomisation of the values, 
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the average treatment effect of each value is non-parametrically identified, which they 
label as the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE). For further details see (28). 
  
 
Analysis 
The traditional way to estimate how the information treatments affect respondents’ choice 
in the conjoint would be to include interaction effects between dummy variables for the 
attribute values and the treatment conditions. This, however, results in substantial 
statistical inefficiency as it introduces a number of strongly collinear variables to estimate 
parameters for, of which many of these effects may be zero. 
 
To avoid this issue for identifying the treatment effects, we use a recently developed 
estimator, LASSOplus (29). This estimator both selects and estimates the relevant 
heterogenous effects to estimate, in a way that also accounts for the fact that 
respondents evaluate multiple conjoint profiles. By simultaneously selecting and 
estimating the heterogenous effects it avoids the bias that can occur by conducting 
several separate sub-group analyses, and also provides appropriate measures of 
uncertainty. To estimate the most popular proposal we revert to using a logistic 
regression. The analysis is conducted using R version 3.4.3, and version 1.2 of the 
sparsereg library, using the default settings of 200 saved posterior samples, with a burn-
in of 200 samples using thinning (retaining every 10th sample).
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Comprehension Check  
 
Results of the comprehension check are shown in Supplementary Figure 3. US 
respondents performed very well in terms of treatment comprehension. However 
we do find that Chinese respondents performed poorly when answering the 
question of whether China increased or decreased emissions in the time period. 
Specifically a majority answer that China did not increase emissions in this time 
period. However when examining the information about other country(ies) 
behavior, pass rates are significantly higher. Therefore for the important part of 
our treatment, we are confident that most respondents correctly understood it. 
Nevertheless we re-estimated the statistical models where we exclude individuals 
who failed the comprehension check. In this case the results do not substantively 
change for either country. 
 
 
Supplementary Figures 4 and 5 display how the main effects vary comparing the 
whole sample (Intention-to-Treat effects) to the sample that only includes those 
who passed the comprehension check (Exclude Failures) for both USA and China. 
As is clear from the two figures, the preferences toward international agreements 
remain consistent. Supplementary Figures 6 and 7 show the estimated 
heterogenous effects from this approach and leads us to much the same 
conclusion. While excluding failures leads to two additional effects for those in the 
China only information group, we believe this is not a large enough change to lead 
us to believe that our original results are severely biased 
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